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MINORS AND CONTRACEPTIVES: THE PHYSICIAN'S
RIGHT TO ASSIST UNMARRIED MINORS
IN CALIFORNIA
The changing attitude of Americans towards voluntary population control has been recently reflected in the actions of legislatures

and courts. Unfortunately, one short term product of their efforts
is confusion. This note will examine a small area of the emerging law
of voluntary population control: the right of physicians to provide unmarried minors in California with contraceptive assistance. To clarify
both the problem and the law, an attempt has been made to indicate,
first, the need to provide minors with contraceptive assistance, second,
the changing attitude of legislatures and courts towards the distribution
and use of contraceptives, and finally, the potential criminal penalties
and civil liability faced by a physician in California who makes contraceptive services available to unmarried minors without first obtaining the consent of the minor's parent. It will be shown that, when the
physician deems such assistance necessary, the potential for liability
presently existing is insufficient to justify a denial of contraceptive assistance to minors.
The Need for Contraceptive Assistance
Because of the uncertainty as to the legal ramifications of providing unmarried minors with contraceptive services, many physicians are
reluctant to render any assistance.' Those who do provide help may
1. See, e.g., Holder, Minors and Contraception, 216 J.A.M.A. 2059 (1971);
Howard, Comprehensive Service Programs for School-Age Pregnant Girls, 15 CHILDREN 193, 195 (1968); Russell, Law, Medicine and Minors, Part 11, 278 NEw ENGLAND
J. OF MEDICINE 265, 266 (1968). Any uncertainty as to the legal consequences of
making contraceptives available to minors in California will be resolved if S. 433, 1972
Reg. Sess., is enacted. The bill would add the following language to the California
Civil Code as section 34.8: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law, a
minor who has been determined by a licensed physician or surgeon to be sexually
active may give consent to the furnishing of medical care related to the use, fitting
and dispensing of contraceptive devices or drugs, and such consent shall not be subject
to disaffirmance because of minority. The consent of the parent or parents shall
not be necessary in order to authorize such medical care."
In 1970 a similar bill, S. 542, was passed by the California legislature but vetoed by Governor Reagan. His objection to the bill was that it "could be construed
to permit a minor girl to consent to a sterilization operation without her parents'
knowledge or consent. The bill involves matters that should properly be the concern

of the parents of an unmarried minor girl."

3
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require that the minor first obtain the consent of a parent or guardian.
Because of the inability of many minors to discuss their contraceptive
needs with their parents, only a small percentage of sexually active
minors can actually obtain assistance in avoiding pregnancies.'
The
consequence is too often the birth of unwanted children that aggravate population problems and inflict personal hardships.
Increased Population Pressures
The most obvious result of denying contraceptive services to minors is increased population pressures. Some writers suggest that the
sheer number of Americans is already contributing to a pervasive deterioration in the quality of life.3 Yet, despite the apparent need to
stabilize its growth, the population of the United States is increasing by
6,000 people per day--or over 2,000,000 per year.4 A significant
fraction of this total represents the offspring of unwed minors. It is
estimated that in 1970 unmarried minors gave birth to 350,000 children.5 An undetermined number of other children were conceived
out of wedlock but born to parents subsequently married. 6
In California, as in the nation as a whole, the unplanned pregnancies of unmarried minors represent a substantial source of population
pressure. In 1967, 41 percent of all illegitimate births in California
were to women under twenty7 and 40 percent of all California
2. Gordis, Fasset, Finkelstein, Tayback, Adolescent Pregnancy: A HospitalBased Program for Primary Prevention, 58 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 849, 856 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Gordis].
3. See, e.g., Day, The PopulationProblem in the United States in The 99th Hour,
reprinted in Hearings on Effects of Population Growth on Natural Resources and the
Environment Before the House Subcomm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 152 (1969). Day believes that "in combination with our high material levels
of living population increase in this country has already necessitated greater restrictions
on individual behavior, greater centralization in government, rising economic costs and
taxes, crowded schools and recreation areas, vanishing countryside, air and water
pollution, endless traffic jams, crowded court schedules, and a steady loss in time, solitude, quiet, beauty, and peace of mind. This deterioration we are experiencing right
now. Yet, half of us can expect to live long enough to see in this country, if present
rates continue, a population of nearly 400 million, and the difficulties attending
population increased and magnified by the fact of two Americans for every one here
now."

4. COMM. ON POPULATION GRoWTH & AMEICAN FuTuRE, INTERIM COMM. REPORT ON POPULATION GROWTH AND AMERICA'S FuTuRE 7 (1971).
5. Young, Alverson & Young, Court-Ordered Contraception, 55 A.B.A.J. 223
(1969).
6. Furstenburg, Gordis, Markowitz, Birth Control Knowledge and Attitudes
Among Unmarried Pregnant Adolescents: A Preliminary Report, 31 J. OF MAMUAGE
AND THE FAMILY 34 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Furstenburg].
7. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, ILLEGITIMATE BmTHs IN CALIFORmNA

1966-1967 16 (1971) (14,687 of 34,640 illegitimate children were born to minors).
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women who married before their twentieth birthday were pregnant at
the time the ceremony was performed. 8 If these percentages have
held constant, as many as 35,500 of the 364,000 children born in
1970 in California9 were conceived by unmarried women under
twenty."° These figures clearly indicate that unmarried minors must be
considered a significant source of population pressures.
Personal Consequences of Pregnancy
Perhaps more important than the general exacerbation of population pressures is the personal hardship that so often characterizes the
pregnancy of an unmarried minor. The adolescent who discovers she
is pregnant may pursue several courses of conduct. Often, however, the
choice is only among competing tragedies.
If the minor chooses a legal "therapeutic" abortion, as did 25,000
California minors in 1970,1" she must convince a medical committee
that there is a substantial risk that the continuance of her pregnancy
will gravely impair her physical or mental health, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.'
If she chooses an illegal abortion, she faces criminal penalties 13 and a substantially increased risk to
impairment to her health. 1 4 In either case she is likely to experience
feelings of guilt or other adverse psychological reactions and incur
social disapproval of her decision. 5
8. Hearings of Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. of Judiciary on Legal Aspects of
Sterilization, Abortion and Family Planning, App. E (Oct. 22, 1970) (20,800 of the
52,000 women who married before their twentieth birthday were pregnant at the time
of the ceremony).
9. CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ACT 2 (1971).

10.
11.
12.

13.

Estimate based on statistics in notes 7 & 8 supra.
Id.
CAL. HEALTH AND S. CODE § 2591 (West Supp. 1971).
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 275 (West 1970): "Every woman who solicits of any

person any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, and takes the same, or who submits

to any operation, or to the use of any means whatever, with intent thereby to procure a
miscarriage, except as provided in the Therapeutic Abortion Act . . . is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than five years."
14. See Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion, STUDIES IN
FAMILY PLANNING 6 (Sept. 1969). Based on current statistics from eastern European
countries, Dr. Tietze estimates that the mortality rate associated with legal abortions
performed in a hospital, at an early stage of gestation, is 3 deaths per 100,000.
The mortality rate associated with illegal abortions induced out of hospitals by persons without medical training is 100 deaths per 100,000 abortions. Dr. Tietze considers this latter figure to be "a very rough estimate, and, almost certainly conserva-

tive, since it is lower than the maternal mortality rate, excluding abortion, per
100,000 live births for white women in the United States 25 years ago." Id.
15.

For a brief survey of studies on the psychological effects of abortion see D.
67-71 (1970).

CALLAHAN, ABORTION
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If the unmarried minor chooses to give birth, she is confronted
with other difficulties. The younger she is, the greater is the risk of
harm to her health and that of her child, 16 and even if they both survive, her youthfulness may prevent the formation of an adequate
mother-child relationship.' 7 A marriage to "legitimize" the child may
serve only to complicate and aggravate her difficulties. Nevertheless,
if she does not marry there is a strong statistical likelihood that she
will have additional illegitimate children.'
Formal education is also frequently terminated by a minor's pregnancy. Dr. Beasley, director of the Center for Population and Family
Studies at Tulane University, asserts that pregnancy is the single largest
cause of school dropouts among teenagers in the lower socio-economic
classes. 19 This in turn limits employment opportunities and in many
cases results in permanent dependence on public assistance. 20
Certainly not all pregnancies of unmarried minors could be prevented merely by recognizing the right of physicians to render birth
control assistance. However, available data does suggest that such
pregnancies are not primarily the function of "any patterns of sexual
promiscuity or cultural value supporting pregnancy outside of marriage." 2 Rather, the failure to practice birth control stems more from
limited knowledge of birth control methods and a lack of availability
of the necessary materials. 2 This strongly suggests that increasing
access to contraceptives and birth control information is an effective
way of preventing pregnancies. Unfortunately, while the effectiveness
of this approach appears unquestionable, the right of the physician to
employ it is much less certain. The problem, therefore, is to determine the extent to which the physician in California can legally
make contraceptives available to unmarried minors.
Changing Attitudes Toward Contraceptives
For the past century the distribution of contraceptives in the United
States has been either stringently limited or entirely prohibited by federal and state laws. As early as 1873 Congress passed an antiobscenity measure that banned both the importation and the shipment of
16. Howard, Comprehensive Service Programs for School-Age Pregnant Girls,
15 CHILDREN 193, 194 (1968).
17. Gordis, supra note 2, at 849.
18.

Id. at 855.

19. Hearings on S. 2108 and S. 3219 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 69 (1970).
20. Gordis, supra note 2, at 855.
21. Furstenberg, supra note 6, at 42.
22.

Id.
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contraceptives through the mail. 2'3 In 1905 Congress extended the
scope of this ban to the interstate shipment of contraceptives by any
common carrier whatsoever.24
Following the lead of the federal government, every state except
New Mexico enacted its own obscenity legislation.25 While some of
these laws made no specific reference to contraceptives, all contained
language which could be interpreted as barring their distribution or
use. One of the harshest of the morality measures was Connecticut's.
In that state it was a crime for anyone to use "any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception .
*...26
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut interpreted this language
as prohibiting the use of contraceptives even by a married woman who,
because of an illness, might die or suffer serious physical harm in
the event of a pregnancy.Moreover, any physician who supplied
contraceptives to such a patient was also guilty of a crime under the
state's accessory law. 5
In more recent years, however, the attitude of legislatures and
courts towards the dissemination of contraceptives has shifted dramatically. In 1971 Congress removed most of the sanctions against importing and transporting contraceptives in interstate commerce. 9 At present, federal criminal penalties attach only to the unsolicited mailing of
contraceptives and contraceptive advertisements to people outside the
30
health professions.
In addition to eradicating the most onerous of the old prohibitions
against the distribution of contraceptives, Congress has also taken affirmative steps to increase their availability. In 1970 Congress passed
the Family Service and Population Research Act,3 having as one of its
23. Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, §§ 1-3, 17 Stat. 598 (now 18 U.S.C. §H 1461,
1462 (1970), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970).
24. Act of Feb. 8, 1905, ch. 550, 33 Stat. 705. For current law see text accompanying notes 29-30 infra.
25. R. WEINBERG, LAWS GOVERNING FAMILY PLANNING 9 (1968).
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958), repealed, 1969 Pub. Act. 828, § 214.
"Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
27. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-196 (1958), repealed, 1969 Pub. Act. 828,
§ 214. "Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another
to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender."
29. Act of Jan. 8, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-662, §§ 3, 4, 84 Stat. 1973, amending
18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1964), 39 U.S.C. 4001 (1964).
30.

Id.

31. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504.
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stated purposes to "assist in making comprehensive voluntary family
planning services readily available to all persons desiring such services."'3 2 The act also created the Office of Population Affairs, an
agency responsible for population research and family planning programs. Thus, in the space of two years, Congress not only abandoned
its position as an opponent of contraceptives, it became an active proponent of their distribution.
The first major case which indicated the changing attitude of the
courts towards contraceptives is Griswold v. Connecticut 8 in which
the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Connecticut's anticontraceptive statute. Justice Douglas, in the opinion
for the Court, found that a state statute attaching criminal penalties
to the use of contraceptives by married persons was "repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship" 4 and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court quoted the language of NAACP v. Alabama:3 6
[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of
37
protected freedoms.
Six years after the cloak of constitutional protection was drawn
around the use of contraceptives in marriage, a federal court of appeals, in Baird v. Eisenstadt" considered the right of unmarried
adults to obtain and use contraceptives. The court was confronted
with the issue when Baird filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging that Massachusett's anticontraceptive statute was unconstitutional.8 9 While the statute allowed the distribution of contraceptives
32. Id. § 2(1).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
34. Id. at 486.
35. Id. at 481-86.
36. 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1963).
37. 381 U.S. at485.
38. 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970), affd, 92 S. Ct 1029 (1972).
39. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 21, 21A (1970). Section 21, originally
enacted in 1879, provides that anyone who "sells, lends, gives away, exhibits or offers
to sell, lend or give away ... any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for
the prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abortion . . . shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail or the house
of correction for not more than two and one half years or by a fine of not less than one
hundred nor more than one thousand dollars."
Section 21A was enacted in 1966-after the decision in Griswold v. Connecticutand provides, in part, as follows: "A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. A registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business of
pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician. .. ."

1492
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by physicians and pharmacists to married persons, it specifically prohibited any distribution to unmarried persons. 40 Baird violated this
law when, after lecturing on family planning to a college audience, he
gave an unmarried adult woman a package of vaginal foam, a "publically advertised contraceptive."'" In challenging the statute's constitutionality, Baird argued that it bore no real and substantial relation to the
public health or morals.4"
The court of appeals was wholly unimpressed by the attempt
of Massachusetts to show that the statute barring distribution to single
persons bore a rational relation to public health. Instead, the court
found that
If the prohibition . . . is to be taken to mean that the same
physician who can prescribe for married patients does not have
sufficient skill to protect the health of patients who lack a marriage certificate, or who may be currently divorced, it is illogical
to the point of irrationality. . . . [W]e do not believe that health
is the legislative purpose, but if it is, we hold the 43statute is arbitrary, and by the same token, grossly discriminatory.
Massachusetts met with no greater success when it asserted that
the statute was protecting public morals by denying unmarried persons access to contraceptives. In declaring the statute unconstitutional,
the Baird court held that the statute 44
was merely an attempt to declare contraceptives themselves immoral:
To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be
forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in
having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for
society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of morality
is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the
absence of demonstrated
harm, we hold it is beyond the compe45
tency of the state.
On appeal the United States Supreme Court agreed that the Massachusetts statute could not be upheld as either a health measure or as a
deterrent to premarital sexual relations. 46 In affirming the decision discharging Baird, the Court specifically declined to decide whether legislation denying access to those contraceptives not constituting a health
hazard conflicted with fundamental human rights. While the court
of appeals had concluded that such legislation was "beyond the com40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
429 F.2d at 1399.
Id. at 1400.
Id. at 1401.
Id. at 1401-02.
Id. at 1402.
92 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (1972).
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petency of the state," the Supreme Court found the statute constitutionally offensive on more narrow equal protection grounds. "[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike."4
Finding no rational basis for distinguishing between married and unmarried individuals, the Court held that a statute conditioning access to
48
contraceptives upon marital status was underinclusive and invidious.
If Griswold is interpreted to mean that a state cannot prohibit
the distribution of contraceptives, Baird assures that distribution cannot be prohibited to unmarried persons. Unfortunately, the scope of
the holding in Griswold is unclear. Interpreted narrowly, Griswold
held only that a state statute forbidding the use of contraceptives by
married persons unnecessarily invaded a protected area of marital privacy. It did not consider the constitutionality of laws banning distribution. While both the Massachusetts legislature and the court of appeals
in Baird apparently interpreted Griswold as controlling in this latter
situation as well, the Supreme Court expressly left open this interpeta-

tion.

49

Because of this uncertainty as to the scope of the Griswold holding, it cannot be said at present that adults have a constitutionally protected right of access to contraceptives. Even if future litigation does
establish the existence of such a right, it will not necessarily follow
that minors have a similar right. It has traditionally been recognized
that the "state's authority over children's activities is [more broad] than
that over like actions of adults."5 0 For present purposes, the significance of Griswold and Baird is not that they provide definitive answers but that they indicate an increasing disenchantment with the notion that state regulation of contraceptives is an appropriate means
of influencing the morality of individuals. Just as the Family Service
and Population Research Act 51 illustrates the changing attitudes of the
legislatures, Griswold and Baird indicate the changing attitudes of
the courts.
Of course, a mere change in attitude towards the distribution of
contraceptives does not necessarily mean that a physician may make
birth control materials available to minors without incurring liability.
The existence of liability can only be determined by examining the
law at its present stage of development. The remainder of this note
will consider the law of California to determine the actual risks of liability a California physician presently faces when he chooses in the
47.
48.
49.
50,
51.

Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
See note 31 supra.
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exercise of sound professional discretion to make contraceptive services
available to an unmarried minor without the consent of the minor's
parent.
Sources of Potential Criminal Sanctions
In any given case there may be a multiplicity of moral, social, and
religious reasons to justify a physician in declining an unmarried minor's request for birth control assistance. Yet the magnitude of the
need-and the social and personal consequences of neglect-suggest
that any restrictions on meeting the contraceptive needs of a large number of unmarried minors should be based upon something more substantial than a physician's possibly unwarranted or exaggerated fear of incurring legal sanctions.
Any fear of incurring criminal sanctions by meeting the contraceptive needs of sexually active minors is virtually unwarranted under
California's laws. In examining the potential sources of sanctions, two
classes of statutes will be considered: (a) Those which may directly affect the distribution of contraceptives, and (b) those designed
to protect the morals of minors.
Statutes Affecting the Distribution of Contraceptives
Although California has no laws which specifically limit the distribution or use of contraceptives, 52 sections 4300 through 4325 of the
Business and Professions Code do regulate the distribution of prophylactics. Prophylactics include any "device, appliance or medicinal agent
used in the prevention of venereal disease."53 The distribution of
those which both prevent disease and also have contraceptive attributes (prophylactic contraceptives) will be controlled by these sections. "
The specific section applicable to physicians provides that
they may dispense prophylactics in the "regular practice of their
profession and to their patients, in the manner specified for a licensee.")5 Until 1970 licensees who made prophylactics available to persons under eighteen years of age committed a misdemeanor. 5 6 The
52. The only California statute specifically limiting the distribution of contraceptives or contraceptive information in California is Business and Profession Code
section 601. This section makes it a felony to advertise contraceptives or contraceptive
services. It exempts from its coverage the dissemination of contraceptive information
for purposes of public health education by one not interested in the sale of contraceptives.
53. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4301 (West 1962).

54. E.g., id. § 4310. It establishes quality standards for "sheath prophylactics."
See J. PEEL & M. Pors, TEXTBOOK OF CONTRACEPTIVE PRAcrICE 60-61 (1969).
55. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4304 (West 1962).
56. Violation of any of the provisions of the article concerning prophylactics
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however, so that there is currently
limiting section has been amended,
57
no minimum age requirement.
Thus, the statutes regulating the distribution of prophylactic contraceptives do not prevent a licensee or a physician from dispensing
them to minors of any age. This interpretation is consistent with a
provision of the California Administrative Code that requires physicians
to instruct all patients suspected of having a venereal disease in "precautionary measures for preventing the spread of disease."58 It would
be useless for a physician to instruct a minor in precautionary measures if he could not make prophylactics available.
The deliberate act of the legislature in deleting any age requirement from the code section controlling the distribution of prophylactics may fairly be interpreted as allowing physicians to provide sexually
active minors, regardless of age, with prophylactics that incidentally
possess contraceptive properties. However, the section does not authorize the distribution to minors of contraceptives that are not also
prophylactics. It therefore will not shelter a physician from any risk
of incurring criminal penalties if he dispenses a contraceptive, such as
an oral contraceptive or intrauterine device (UD) that lacks prophylactic attributes. Accordingly, the physician dispensing such contraceptives must consider the possibility of incurring criminal penalties under other statutes. The only other statutes having possible application
are those designed to protect the morals of minors.
Statutes Protecting the Morals of Minors
Like other states, California recognizes "the deficiencies of minors in respect of their mental and moral faculties and [has] thrown
around them the protection which their immature years demand." 59
Two of the California statutes designed to protect minors may limit a
physician's right to provide birth control services to unmarried minor
patients. These prohibit respectively the distribution of harmful matter to minors, and any conduct which may contribute to a minor's
delinquency.
DistributingHarmful Matter
In California it is a misdemeanor to distribute or exhibit harmful matter to a minor.60 For purposes of this statute, harmful matter
is a misdemeanor. Id. § 4325. A misdemeanor is punishable by "imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars,
or by both." CAL. PEN. CoDE § 19 (West 1970).
57. CAL. Bus. & PROF. COD- § 4319 (West Supp. 1971).
58. 17 CAL. ADM. CODE§ 2636(g) (1961).
59. People v. Baker, 38 Cal. App. 28, 34, 175 P. 88, 90 (1918).
60. CAL. PEN. CODE § 313.1 (West Supp. 1971).
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is "matter which taken as a whole. . . is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors," and whose primary appeal is to a "prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion ... ."61 Obviously, neither pregnancy prevention literature nor
contraceptives themselves fall within the proscription of this statute.
Contraceptives are not designed to appeal to prurient interests, and the
prevention of unwanted pregnancies seems to be of some "redeeming
social importance for minors." Even if contraceptives were found to
have a prurient appeal, however, it is a defense in any prosecution
that the distribution or exhibition was for "educational purposes."62
Contributingto the Delinquency of a Minor
California Penal Code section 272 makes it a misdemeanor to perform any act which causes or tends to cause any person under twentyone years to come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.63 A
minor comes within the juvenile court's jurisdiction when he is "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life."6
A single
61.
62.

Id. § 313 (West 1970).
Id. § 313.3.

63. CAL. PEN. CODE § 272 (West 1970), referring to CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE §§ 600-02 (West 1966). In 1971 the legislature lowered the age of majority for
most purposes from twenty-one to eighteen years. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1748, §§ 1-78,
at 354-400. The legislature did not amend section 272 of the Penal Code, however.
For the purposes of this section, a minor continues to be defined as any person under
twenty-one years of age. This creates something of an anomaly. The offense proscribed by section 272 is that of causing a minor to come or remain within the provisions of sections 600, 601, and 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. These sections describe minors who are within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As
amended, the sections are applicable only to persons under eighteen years of age. Cal.
Stats. 1971, Ch. 1748, §§ 64-66, at 392-93. If the more expansive definition of
"minor" found in Penal Code section 272 is to be harmonized with the Welfare and
Institutions Code provisions, section 272 must be interpreted as proscribing those acts
which would cause a person between the age of eighteen and twenty-one to come
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if that person were under eighteen. Alternatively, the failure to amend section 272 of the Penal Code may have been legislative oversight. A reduction in the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen for
purposes of this section would, of course, eliminate any risk of liability under this
section that might attach to the act of providing persons over eighteen with contraceptives.
64.

CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1966).

The language quoted was

found by a three judge district court to be "too vague to serve as a constitutionally permissible standard on which to base an arrest or an adjudication of a juvenile as a
ward of a court." Gonzalez v. Mailliard, - F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 50424 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 9, 1971), appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1971). Presumably the
language may also be too vague to serve as a standard on which to base an arrest of
an adult for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. If the United States Supreme Court affirms the decision on appeal, it can be anticipated that the substance
of the provision will be reenacted in a constitutionally acceptable form. Thus, while
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act tending to produce such a result 6 5 or which tends to cause a minor66
to remain delinquent is sufficient for a conviction under this section;
it is not necessary that the act be otherwise illegal," that the actor
intend to encourage juvenile delinquency, 6" or that the juvenile actually
become delinquent. 9 All that is required 7is0 that the act have a reasonable tendency to bring about such a result.
Thus if one result of making contraceptives available to minors is
an increase in promiscuity, it is arguable that providing contraceptives
to minors does contribute to their delinquency within the meaning of
the statute. However, the available data does not support this premise. No relationship has been established between the amount of sexual activity and the availability of contraceptives. 7 1 An adaptation of
a report of the Council of the Section of Family Law of the American
Bar Association stated that
In view of the impulsiveness of adolescence as well as the lack of
foresight and trust to luck against pregnancy observed among sexually mature teen-agers . . . the availability of birth-control cannot be thought to be the determinant of whether or not they
engaged in sexual relations. The development of a youthful standard of sexual morality is a matter for the home, the church, and
maintained through ignorance of the
the community: it cannot be
72
availability of birth-control.
Even assuming that access to contraceptives does encourage sexual activity among minors, it must be noted that some relatively effective prophylactic contraceptives are already available to the knowledgeable minor without the assistance of a physician.73 If the physician makes oral contraceptives or an IUD available, he is not providing a contraceptive service that would otherwise be wholly unavailable; he is only increasing the degree of contraceptive protection
the constitutionality of the quoted language is questionable, it will still be valuable to
consider whether the act of providing a minor with contraceptive assistance can be
found to contribute to the minor's delinquency.
65. People v. Norris, 254 Cal. App. 2d 296, 300, 62 Cal. Rptr. 66, 69 (1967)
(sexual intercourse with minor).
66. People v. Lowell, 77 Cal. App. 2d 341, 345, 175 P.2d 846, 848 (1946)
(sexual intercourse with minor).
67. People v. Miller, 145 Cal. App. 2d 473, 478, 302 P.2d 603, 607 (1956)
(fornication committed in presence of minor); People v. Baker, 38 Cal. App. 28, 31,
175 P. 88, 89 (1918) (selling beer to minor).
68. People v. Baker, 38 Cal. App. 28, 31, 175 P. 88, 89 (1918) '(selling
beer to minor).
69. People v. Mitchell, 148 Cal. App. 2d 733, 734, 307 P.2d 411, 412 (1957)
(fondled genitals of sixteen year old boy).
70. Id.
71. Gordis, supranote 2, at 857.
72, Dembitz, Law and Family Planning, 1 FAmmY L.Q. 112 (1967) (adapted
from a report approved by the Council of the Section of Family Law of the A.B.A.).
73. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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already obtainable. To convict a physician of contributing to a minor's delinquency, it would therefore be necessary to prove that it was
the extra increment of birth prevention protection that encouraged the
minor to become sexually active.
When all the possible sources of criminal liability are considered, it becomes clear that the California physician need have little fear
of incurring criminal sanctions by meeting the contraceptive needs of
unmarried minors. When he dispenses prophylactic contraceptives,
he may rely on an authorization implied in the legislature's repeal of
the minimum age requirement previously restricting distribution. When
he provides minors with contraceptives that lack prophylactic attributes, however, the physician acts without the shelter of an authorizing
statute and therefore faces a theoretical risk of violating a statute designed to protect the morals of minors. But, as has been shown, access to contraceptives does not determine the extent of sexual activity
among minors. Further, since prophylactic contraceptives are already
available, the physician is simply increasing the degree of protection already at the minor's disposal. Where the minor has already decided to be sexually active and the physician determines that a pregnancy will jeopardize her physical or mental well-being, it is highly unlikely that his assistance in helping her avoid a health-endangering
pregnancy can be considered as contributing to her delinquency.
Potential Civil Liability
Although a physician incurs little risk of criminal sanctions in
making contraceptives available to minors, the possibility of civil liability remains. A determination of the actual risk of liability necessitates a consideration of the minor's ability to consent effectively to
medical contraceptive services. Therefore the basic inquiry is whether
or not the minor's consent is sufficient to insulate the physician from
tort liability.
Consent
The traditional rule is that the parent is the proper person to give
consent to the medical or surgical treatment of a minor. 4 Under normal circumstances surgical treatment undertaken without valid consent
constitutes a battery. 5 Since a battery requires only that the actor in74. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (skin taken
from 15 year old boy for the benefit of his cousin); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 9,
260 N.W. 99, 102 (1935) (tonsillectomy performed on 9' year old boy); Rogers v.
Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 104, 61 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1936) (amputation of foot of 14 year
old boy); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920) (tonsillectomy performed on 11 year old with consent of adult sister).
75. See, e.g., Rainer v. Buena Community Memorial Hosp., 18 Cal. App. 3d 240,
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tentionally and without consent set in motion a force which ultimately

produces a contact, 76 it is possible that any unauthorized medical treat-

ment will also be held to constitute a battery. 77 The physician might
therefore commit a battery merely by prescribing a drug for a minor
without the consent of the minor's parent. Even if the physician performed skillfully, such a battery would render the physician liable for
all harm proximately resulting from the treatment. 78
The last few years have seen a steady erosion in California of the
traditional rule requiring parental consent. The risk of a civil battery
involved in providing minors with contraceptives has been correspond-

ingly reduced. By statute married minors79 and minors on active duty
with the armed forces" can now consent to necessary hospital, medi-

cal, and surgical care. Another statute provides that a minor who is
at least 15 years old, living apart from his parents or guardians, and

managing his own financial affairs is similarly competent to consent to
any needed hospital, medical, or surgical care.81
These three classes of minors, therefore, have a statutorily recog255, 95 Cal. Rptr. 901, 910 (1971); Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal. App. 2d 212, 233,
36 Cal. Rptr. 537, 551 (1964); Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 806,
327 P.2d 131, 135 (1958); Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 38, 224 P.2d 808,
811 (1950); Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 491, 96 P.2d 142, 145 (1939).
76.

W. PROSSER, THm LAw oF ToRTs § 9 (4th ed. 1971).

77. E.g., Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 (1973), State v. Monroe, 121 N.C. 677, 28 S.E. 547 (1897). In Monroe a druggist was convicted of
criminal assault and battery because he adulterated candy with croton oil, having reason to know that the purchaser intended to administer the candy to another as a joke.
In Stratton the defendant secretly filled a quantity of figs with "love powders" before
presenting them to a "certain young woman." When the woman ate the figs, she became sick. The defendant was convicted of criminal assault. While the defendant
clearly did not wish to harm the woman, the court found that he did administer a
drug to the woman without her consent and that this act was sufficient to constitute
an assault and battery. It is arguable that a physician who provides a minor with an
oral contraceptive without obtaining consent of the minor's parent is in the same position as these defendants.
Both Monroe and Stratton were criminal assault and battery cases, not civil.
The definitions of criminal and tortious battery are not identical; tortious battery
includes only intentional invasions of the bodily integrity of another while criminal
battery also includes criminally negligent invasions. R. PERKiNs, CRIMNAL LAw 111112 (2nd ed. 1969). For present purposes, however, the distinction is unimportant.
The underprivileged invasions of both defendants were intentional.
78. Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp., 18 Cal. App. 3d 240, 255, 95
Cal. Rptr. 901, 910 (1971); Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1969); Pedesky v. Bleiberg, 251 Cal. App. 2d 119, 123, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 294, 297 (1967). For possible side effects associated with commonly used contraceptives, see J. PEEL & M. Powrs, Thxrnoox oF CoNTRAcEPTwVE PRACTIcE (1969)

(passim).
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.6 (West Supp. 1971).
80. Id. § 25.7.
81. Id. § 34.6.
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nized ability to consent to medical care. There can be little doubt
that this includes the ability to consent to medical contraceptive services. Accordingly, a physician who makes contraceptives available to
minors who are on active military duty, married or emancipated need
not worry about parental consent.
Another statute of a more limited nature provides that a minor of
any age may obtain, without parental consent, any hospital, medical, or
surgical care related to her pregnancy. 82 In Ballard v. Anderson8 3
the California Supreme Court interpreted this provision to include surgery terminating a pregnancy. Even if a minor is living with her parents and dependent upon them for support, she may obtain a therapeutic abortion over their active objection, provided she meets the other
requirements.8 4 While this section is unlikely to be construed as encompassing pregnancy prevention care as well as pregnancy termination, 5 it does indicate legislative confidence in the ability of even young
minors to consent to medical procedures far more serious than the
swallowing of an oral contraceptive or the implanting of an IUD.
The Welfare Reform Act, 86 which became law in 1971, goes substantially beyond merely indicating legislative confidence in the ability
of minors to consent to contraceptive assistance. A section 7 of that
act provides family planning services to all former, current, or potential 8 welfare recipients between the ages of fifteen and forty-four. These
services are provided without regard to marital status or parenthood.
In addition, since the act specifically provides that the only consent
required is that of the recipient, there is no danger that minority alone
will render consent ineffective. Available medical contraceptive services include, among others, diagnosis, treatment, supplies and follow-up.8 ° Thus, California not only specifically approves of certain
economic classes of minors receiving contraceptives without parental
consent, it actually distributes contraceptives to them.
As noted above, the Welfare Reform Act authorized the state to
82.

Id. § 34.5 (West 1954).

83. 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
84. Id. For therapeutic abortion requirements see CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§
25951, 25954 (West Supp. 1971).

85. 4 Cal. 3d at 882, 484 P.2d at 1351, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
86. Cal. Stats. 1971, § 16, at 1134 (West's Cal. Leg. Serv. 1971) (enacted as
CAL. WELF. & INS'NS CODE §

10053.2(a) ).

87.

Id.

88.

"Potential recipients" are defined as "all persons in a family where current

social, economic and health conditions of the family indicate that the family would
likely become a recipient of financial assistance within the next five years."
Id.

The expansive nature of this definition is some indication of the legislature's intent ta
make contraceptives available to a broad group of minors.
89. Id.
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provide contraceptives and ancillary medical care only to those who
can qualify as past, present, or potential welfare recipients. However,
information and referral services are to be made available to "all other
families and children." 90 The existence of a referral service seems to
indicate a legislative intention to make contraceptives available to all
minors at least 15 years old, with or without parental consent. Nothing
would be accomplished by providing minors with referrals to private
physicians and clinics if the physicians and clinics could not render assistance.
Even if the statute did not provide for referrals, however, it
could not be reasonably argued that the ability of a minor to consent
to contraceptive services is a function of parental income. If the child
of a welfare recipient is capable of consenting, there is no logical basis
for contending that the child of a parent not receiving welfare is somehow incapable of consenting. Rather, it is far more reasonable to interpret the Welfare Reform Act as recognizing the ability of all minors
over fifteen years of age to consent to contraceptive assistance.
It would also be unreasonable to contend that the statute, by
authorizing state contraceptive assistance to those over fifteen years,
impliedly forbids assistance to those under that age. Not only may
a minor of any age purchase prophylactic contraceptives, 9 1 she may
obtain a therapeutic abortion9" or offer her child for adoption-all
without parental consent.9 3
Seemingly, therefore, minors in California can effectively consent
to receive medical contraceptive services. For a minor over fifteen years
of age, there is a declared policy of the legislature to make birth control assistance available whether or not the minor has obtained parental consent. If a physician aids a fifteen year old adolescent in avoiding a pregnancy, he is doing nothing more than discharging the policy
of the legislature. For minors under fifteen, there is no express legislative authorization. There are, however, other statutes clearly indicating the ability of even young minors to render effective consent in matters of substantially greater import.
Informed Consent
A physician who provides a minor with contraceptive assistance
has little cause to fear that his patient's age alone will render the patient's consent ineffective. 94 As is true with adults, however, to be
90. Id.
91. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
92. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226 *(West1954).
94. See Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1971). In Ballard the court held that minors could obtain therapeutic abortions
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effective, consent given by a minor must be informed- 5
The requirement that consent be informed places three distinct obligations on the physician. The first is that he must determine if his
patient has the maturity and understanding to reasonably comprehend the medical consequences of the proposed care.9 6 If the minor
lacks the ability to understand the health ramifications of using contraceptives, she is clearly incapable of giving knowledgeable or informed
consent.
The physician's second obligation is to disclose the medical facts
necessary to form an intelligent judgment as to the advisability of undertaking the particular procedure. 97 In the case of contraceptive
services, this at least necessitates mention of the various kinds of contraceptives available, the effectiveness of each in preventing pregnancies, and the possible health hazards involved in the use of each
type of contraceptive as compared to the health hazards inherent in
pregnancies.
This, of course, does not mean that the physician must reveal
every imaginable health hazard to every patient. Excessively detailed horror stories may unduly alarm an apprehensive patient and
thereby hinder her attempt to make an intelligent choice.
[T]he patient's mental and emotional condition is important and
in certain cases may be crucial, and . . . in discussing the element
of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent.9 8
Finally, the physician is obliged to determine whether or not the
patient has actually understood the nature of the proposed care and
its potential hazards.9 9 If the patient does understand, her consent will
be informed and effective. But if she does not, her consent will be
vitiated. Failure to obtain consent that is informed, therefore, may result in a technical battery rendering the physician liable for all damages proximately resulting from the use of the contraceptives, irrespective of the degree of skill exercised.10 0
without parental consent.

While the holding was based on a statute, it does indi-

cate legislative confidence in the ability of minors to consent to medical hazards far
greater than those involved in the use of contraceptives.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97.

Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1083, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319,

333 (1971).
98. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
99. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr.

1,8 (1971).
100.

(1969).

See Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76-77
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The risk of liability that stems from a failure to obtain informed
consent is not something unique to the act of providing minors with
contraceptives. The physician faces the same risk-and must meet the
same requirements to avoid liability-whenever he provides any of
his patients with contraceptive assistance. Against this risk of liability
the physician can readily protect himself by the exercise of a professional standard of care. 1' 1
Conclusion
A great need exists among unmarried minors for contraceptive
assistance. It has been shown that the traditional barriers preventing
the distribution and use of contraceptives are rapidly deteriorating. Under current California law, the physician runs little risk of incurring
criminal sanctions in meeting the contraceptive needs of unmarried
minors. No laws explicitly forbid the distribution of contraceptives to
minors. On the contrary, the distribution of prophylactic contraceptives has been impliedly permitted by the legislature. And while no
similar recognition exists for the distribution of other contraceptives,
the fact that some contraceptives are permitted indicates that the act
of providing minors with contraceptives should not be considered as
contributing to their delinquency. The reasonableness of this conclusion is strengthened by the legislature's decision to put the state of California in the business of providing past, present, and potential welfare
recipients at least fifteen years of age with contraceptives. It is unlikely that the same legislature which made it a crime to contribute to
a minor's delinquency would pass an act which it considered violative of its own law.
Traditionally, there has also been some danger that a physician
who undertook treatment of a minor without the consent of the minor's parent might in so doing commit a technical battery and thereby
become liable for any harm resulting from such treatment. But in
recent years the California legislature has greatly reduced this danger by
repeatedly expressing confidence in the judgment of minors. It has,
for example, required the state to distribute contraceptives to unmarried "welfare" minors at least fifteen years old, irrespective of parental
consent.
101. Assuming the physician does obtain effective consent, other risks of liability
will persist. If the physician fails to adequately warn of the risk of failure, a subsequent pregnancy may give rise to an action for negligence. If the physician states
that all danger of pregnancy is removed, a subsequent pregnancy may give rise to an
action for negligent or intentional misrepresentation, or even breach of contract. See
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 312-313, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469-71
(1967).
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The legislature has also expressed its confidence in the judgment
of even minors under fifteen by providing that they may, without parental consent, obtain prophylactics and medical care for venereal diseases,
undergo therapeutic abortions, or place their children with adoption
agencies. That minors under fifteen can consent to abortions or adoptions strongly suggests that they are also capable of consenting to pregnancy prevention care. So long as the minor's consent is informed,
it should be effective to eliminate any risk of battery involved in contraceptive services.
Accordingly, when an unmarried minor in Caifornia seeks contraceptive services, she should be treated no differently than any
other patient. The physician's first concern is his patient's health.
If he determines the use of contraceptives will promote his patient's
physical and mental health, and his patient understands the medical consequences of employing contraceptives, the physician should feel free
to make them available. Any risk of criminal penalties or civil liability
is insufficient to justify denial of assistance to a sexually active minor.
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